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FEDERAL PRoCEDuRE-VENU:E-lliGHT oF Ar.mN UNDER DIVERSITY OF 
C1TIZENSmP CLAUSE OF 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a)-Plaintiff, a citizen of France and 
resident of New York City, sought a declaratory judgment and restraining order 
against several defendants residing in different states. On the theory that a 
suit involving a citizen of France and citizens of the United States constituted 
"diversity of citizenship" under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a), and therefore could 
be brought where all of the plaintiffs or all of the defendants resided, the action 
was laid in the federal district court of New York where the plaintiff resided. 
Defendant moved for dismissal on the ground that this was "alienage," not 
"diversity of citizenship" as intended under the code, and consequently the suit 
could not be brought in the district of the plaintiff's residence. Held, motion 
sustained. By the words "diversity of citizenship" the legislature did not intend 
to change the old rule that aliens could sue only in the judicial district where 
all of the defendants resided. Because all of the defendants did not reside in 
the same district, several would have to be dropped or the case dismissed. Du 
Roure v. Alvord, (D.C. N.Y. 1954) 120 F. Supp. 166. 
Prior to the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, the basic venue provision 
which had stood virtually unchanged for 61 years read in part: " .•. where 
the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact the action is between citizens of 
different States, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of 
either the plaintiff or defendant • . ."1 Under this provision it was clearly 
1 This provision was first enacted on March 3, 1887. 24 Stat. L. 552, c. 373, §1 
(1887). 
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decided that suits involving aliens and citizens of this country, generally referred 
to as alienage jurisdiction, would not be accorded the venue privileges of 
diversity cases. If the action was against an alien, venue could be laid in any 
district where valid service could be made.2 Where the alien was the plaintiff, 
the action had to be brought in the district where all the defendants resided, 
unless right of venue was waived.3 However, in the 1948 revision of the code 
the words "diversity of citizenship" were substituted for "citizens of different 
States."4 Though the phrase "diversity of citizenship" had frequently been 
used by the courts in referring to the old provision, 5 this seems to be the first 
time the words actually have appeared in a venue provision of the federal code. 
By employing this phrase did the legislature intend to broaden the former venue 
provision so as to include aliens, or is the old rule or discrimination to remain 
unchanged? On the surface the answer appears to lie in section 1332 of the 
revised code. This provision is headed by the catchline ''Diversity of citizenship; 
amount in controversy" and includes among the cases in which the district 
court has jurisdiction suits between "citizens of a State, and foreign states or 
citizens or subjects thereof ."6 The language of this section has led such a 
noted scholar as Professor Moore to conclude that "diversity of citizenship" was 
broadened under the 1948 revision to include alienage jurisdiction, and there-
fore alien plaintiffs could qualify under the special venue provision of section 
139l(a).7 This conclusion seems almost inevitable except for one pitfall. The 
statute which gave birth to the 1948 revision also provides: "No inference of 
a legislative construction is to be drawn . • • by reason of the catchlines used 
in such title."8 In deleting the catchline the value of section 1332 in interpret-
ing "diversity of citizenship" is destroyed. All that remains is an enumeration 
of instances, including alienage, wherein the district court has jurisdiction, 
which alone is meaningless for venue purposes. The only other ground that 
would indicate what the legislature intended is a reviser's note to section 1391 
and its treatment of the word "reside." Part (a) of this section provides that 
if the action is one based solely on diversity of citizenship, the suit may be 
brought "where all plaintiffs or defendants reside.''9 Under the usual defini-
2 In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 14 S.Ct. 221 (1893); Bator v. Boosey & Hawkes, 
(D.C. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 294. 
3 Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Railway Co. v. Gonzales, 151 U.S. 496, 
14 S.Ct. 401 (1894); Keating v. Pennsylvania Co., (D.C. Ohio 1917) 245 F. 155. 
4 Section 139l(a) reads: "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on 
diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the 
judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside." 28 U.S.C. (1952) §l39l(a). 
5 13 WoRDs AND PHRASES, Diverse Citizenship, p. 56 (1940), gives several decisions 
using the old term "diverse citizenship." For a number of later cases using "diversity of 
citizenship" see 13 WoRDs AND PHRASES, Cumnlative Pocket Supp., p. 13 (1954). 
6 28 u.s.c. (1952) §1332. 
7 MooRB, CoMMBNTARY oN U.S. JamcrAL Cons 190 (1949). 
8 This is easy to overlook inasmuch as it is in the enacting statute but not in the main 
body of the code itself. 62 Stat. L. 991, §33 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A., Miscellaneous Provi-
sions, p. 339 (1950). 
9 Note 4 supra. 
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tion of "reside" an alien could be as much a resident as anyone else.10 But 
the legal connotation of this word may vary according to the particular statute 
in which it is used.11 Its technical meaning in this section of the code, as 
suggested by the reviser's note, throws additional light on the interpretation 
of the rest of the provision. The reviser's note states: 'Word 'reside' was sub-
stituted for 'whereof he is an inhabitant' for clarity inasmuch as 'inhabitant' 
and 'reside' are synonymous."12 Because of the peculiar wording of the pro-
vision prior to 1948, the courts had held that an alien was not an "inhabitant" 
for the purposes of ilie venue provision of the judicial code.13 This reasoning 
would not have any bearing on the new wording in the 1948 version except 
for the reviser's note. By making "resident" synonymous with "inhabitant" as 
it stood in the old provision, it would follow that an alien can not "reside" in a 
judicial district within the meaning of section 1391 (a). If an alien cannot 
be considered a resident under this clause, then alienage jurisdiction can hardly 
be included within the meaning of "diversity of citizenship." This was the 
line of reasoning followed by the court in concluding that the old rule requir-
ing aliens to bring suit in the judicial district where all the defendants reside 
still stands despite the rephrasing of the 1948 revision.14 Professor Moore, a 
consultant on the 1948 revision, states an almost identical hypothetical in his 
Commentary on the U.S. Judicial Code and comes out with the opposite 
result.15 Though Moore does not say how he reached his conclusion, it appears 
to be based on the catchline of section 1332. He also makes reference to the 
reviser's note to section 1391,16 but fails to recognize its significance in relation 
10 Bouvier defines residence as "personal presence in a fixed and permanent abode." 
3 Boovnm, L.Aw Th:cnoNARY, 8th ed., p. 2920 (1914). Equally broad, Black gives as one 
definition "living or dwelling in a certain place permanently or for a considerable length of 
time." BLAcK's LAw Th:cnoNARY, 3d ed., 1543 (1933). 
11 In re Jones, 341 Pa. 329, 19 A. (2d) 280 (1941); McGrath v. Stevenson, 194 
Wash. 160, 77 P. (2d) 608 (1938). 
12The words "whereof he is an inhabitant" in what was formerly 28 U.S.C. §112 
refer to the place where the action is brought if not based on diversity. Thus the corre-
sponding provision in the 1948 revision would be part (b) of section 1391 which provides 
if not based on diversity the action must be brought "only in the judicial district where all 
defendants reside." 28 U.S.C. (1952) §l391(b). But inasmuch as the word "reside" is 
also used in part (a) referring to diversity jurisdiction, it seems reasonable to assume that 
it has the same meaning in one part as it has in the other. 
13 The first part of the old venue provision was worded as follows: "no civil suit shall 
be brought before either of said courts against any person by any original process or pro-
ceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant." 24 Stat. L. 552, c. 
373, §1 (1887). If "inhabitant" as used here included aliens and an alien was traveling 
in the United States, yet was not an inhabitant of any judicial district, the citizen would 
have no place to bring the suit. By this interpretation the courts of the United States 
would have been open to suits by aliens against citizens, but not to actions by citizens 
against aliens. To avoid this bizarre result it was early decided that "inhabitant" did not 
include aliens. In re Hohorst, note 2 supra. 
14 See also Stamatiou v. Miller, (D.C. Pa. 1949) 88 F. Supp. 556, for another 
decision following the old rule in excluding aliens after the 1948 revision. 
15 MooRE, CoMMENTARY ON U.S. JUDICIAL CoDB 192 (1949). 
16 Jbid., footnote. 
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to the problem of alien residence. Between the two interpretations it would 
seem that the court stands on the finner ground in avoiding the catchline of 
section 1332.17 Inasmuch as Congress has expressly discriminated against alien 
defendants in part (d) of section 1391,18 it is not unreasonable to conclude 
that it intended the same treatment when the alien is the plaintiff. Perhaps the 
real reason for the change in language of section 1391 (a), if not to include 
aliens, was to extend the venue privileges of this section to citizens of the terri-
tories and the District of Columbia. Part (b) of section 1332 clearly indicates 
that the citizens of the territories and the District of Columbia are to be on 
par with the citizens of the 48 states in diversity jurisdiction.19 By using the 
phrase "diversity of citizenship" they would be afforded equal venue treatment, 
whereas under the old provision they would not. 
Richard M. Adams 
17 It is interesting to note that Judge Dimock cites Moore in support of one point in 
his decision, principal case at 169, yet completely ignores the fact that this same author in 
another volume ends up with a directly contrary conclusion. 
18 "An alien may be sued in any district." 28 U.S.C. (1952) §l39l(d). 
19 In giving the district court jurisdiction of controversies involving citizens of different 
states, Congress defined the word "states" to include the territories and the District of 
Columbia. 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1332(b). 
